Decentralization facilitates more efficient use of local information but also can lead to agency problems and commitment failures. This paper develops simple models of a twotier hierarchy (the center vs. the local) to study the optimal division of lending authority between central and local bank managers. Using a unique data set collected by the authors from a survey of rural financial institutions in China, we empirically assess the determinants of decentralization. We find that concerns over agency problems (collusion and government influence) and especially commitment failures (excessive refinancing) explain the recent trend toward centralization of lending authority. We conclude that the inability of financial systems to exploit local information in weak institutional environments may substantially limit the efficiency of financial intermediation despite financial market liberalization.
Introduction
For the past several decades, liberalization and decentralization of the financial sector has been a main focus of reform in developing countries and more recently in transition economies (e.g., Haggard and Lee, 1995) . Financial liberalization is a process that transforms a heavily regulated system into a market-oriented one. 1 Decentralization vests greater decision-making authority with local management so that they can compete effectively in a market environment. As with other types of decentralization, financial decentralization aims at both promoting lenders' initiative and exploiting local information so that better decisions can be made in allocating resources. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) present a second motive for decentralization. They show that the division of large banks into small ones can serve as a commitment device that helps lenders harden the budget constraint of borrowers. Unlike large banks, small banks are incapable of refinancing ongoing projects independently. Other potential lenders may be unwilling to refinance projects if they have imperfect information about firm quality. Entrepreneurs with bad projects who anticipate refinancing thus may find that it is not profitable to seek financing in the first place.
However, other factors may undermine the potential benefits of decentralization. 2 The disadvantages of decentralization are associated with both agency problems and commitment failures, which are frequently observed in underdeveloped markets or poor regulatory environments commonly found in developing and transition economies. In this paper, we consider two main agency problems and one commitment failure associated with decentralized systems -collusion between local bank managers and borrowers, collusion between local bank managers and local government officials (or government influence), and the commitment problem of lenders not to refinance bad projects (excessive refinancing). 3 1 For example, decentralization in Korea in the early 1980s involved lifting of restrictions on bank management, removing entry barriers in the financial markets, and eliminating policy loans (Nam and Lee, 1995) . 2 Evidence from developing and transition economies cast doubt on the appeal of financial decentralization (see Koford and Tschoegl, 1997; Schmidt, 1998, and Azam, Biais, and Dia, 2000) . 3 Also see Klibanoff and Morduch (1995) , Laffort and Martimort (1998) , and Aghion and Tirole (1997) for discussions of the tradeoffs between centralization and decentralization or integration and delegation.
First, in a decentralized world where information is costly, agents may benefit from colluding with each other at the expense of the principal. In the case of financing, borrowers can bribe local bank managers to approve loans. This idea is similar to that of Strausz (1997) , who uses a principal-supervisor-agent framework to show that collusion between the supervisor and the agent may occur if the principal rewards the agent based on the information generated by the supervisor. The principal hires a supervisor and delegates control rights if and only if she can provide collusion-proof contracts. 4 The second agency problem, often observed in developing and transition economies, is government influence. Local government leaders, as social planners of local communities, internalize not only the economic benefits of running firms but also noneconomic ones. Local government leaders may be concerned with, and frequently rewarded on the basis of, enterprise and employment creation, potential tax extraction, and indicators other than investment profitability (Svejnar, 1990; Jin and Qian, 1998) . This may lead them to support low-return projects, and to apply political pressure to local bank managers over whom they may have influence (Whiting, 2000) . Policy lending and soft budget constraints are a notorious problem plaguing financial institutions in transition economies (Kornai, 1986) . Such problems, however, are considered to be less serious at lower administrative levels (Qian and Roland, 1998) .
Finally, in contrast to Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) , we argue that when decentralization improves local information, this can reduce the ability of lenders to credibly commit not to refinance bad projects, which softens the budget constraint of borrowers. In the context of a corporation, Cremer (1995) shows that more information may hurt the principal's ability to refuse renegotiation. More accurate information may reduce the agent's incentive to work diligently to signal high ability. Berglof and Roland (1998) show that, despite the Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) result, decentralization does not necessarily lead to hard budget constraints if the lender's opportunity cost of refinancing is low and the lender can afford to refinance. In particular, when the liquidation cost is high due to inadequate institutional infrastructure, the lender may lack the credibility to liquidate financially distressed projects. Surprisingly, we could find no existing empirical research on the validity or relative importance of different theories explaining financial decentralization. In this paper, we use bank-level data on managerial decision-making authority in a large transition economy to rigorously test whether theory can explain observed heterogeneity in decentralization of lending authority in financial institutions. The unique data set was collected in surveys of rural financial institutions, enterprises, and local government officials conducted by the author in 1998 in southern China.
The ongoing financial transition in China offers a particular appropriate setting for empirical tests. China is an interesting case because banks recently became commercialized but supporting institutions are not fully developed, leading to rich variation across space in the extent of decentralization and its causes. Financial reform in China aims at transforming its financial institutions from government-run banks to independent financial intermediaries (Qian, 1994; and Lardy, 1998) . Important aspects of China's financial reform were the introduction of bank competition among state-owned banks in the early1990s and the strengthening of profit incentives for managers. Most policy loans were transferred to newly established policy banks. Individual banks have been allowed to decide for themselves whether or not to decentralize loan decision-making to local bank managers.
Interestingly, however, despite the apparent benefits of decentralization, our data show that in practice increasingly commercialized banks with more discretion to delegate lending authority have chosen to centralize control. We speculate that the current trend toward centralization reflects severe agency and especially commitment problems.
Financial transition in China is far from complete. Government interventions have declined but not yet disappeared. Market institutions (e.g., secondary markets) and legal institutions remain poorly developed. Centralization can help resolve agency and commitment problems, although likely at substantial cost in terms of lost information and reduced incentives of local managers. This outcome suggests that rapid commercialization of banking systems in transition economies will not automatically lead to substantial improvement in financial intermediation unless core agency and commitment problems are solved as well.
The problem we examine in this paper is the allocation of lending authority between upper level management (the center) and lower level management (the local). In section 2, we present several simple models to illustrate how different factors affect optimal decentralization within a two-tier hierarchy. This yields a set of theoretical predictions on the effect of key parameters specified in the models. These predictions are summarized at the end of section 2. Section 3 describes financial decentralization and commercialization in China's rural financial sector. Section 4 discusses the estimation strategy and the data used for testing which determinants most affect decentralization of lending authority. Empirical results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Theory
Following the principal-agent model developed by Aghion and Tirole (1997) , we assume that central and local bank managers are endowed with different technologies for gathering information about their customers. The central manager knows only the distribution of project outcomes while the local bank manager has access to costly technology that provides him with perfect information on project outcomes. Our basic model predicts that as long as local information technology is sufficiently cheap the center delegates lending authority to the local bank manager. We also derive comparative statics for the effect of collateral and financial competition on optimal decentralization. We then extend the basic model to examine two types of agency problems (collusion and government influence) and one commitment failure (excessive refinancing). All of the models presume that the center maximizes profits.
The Basic Model: Costly Local Information
We consider a local economy with N firms whose types are uniformly distributed
, is the probability of project success. θ 0 is the least profitable firm type in the economy. We assume that a firm is only able to repay loans when its project is successful. Therefore, θ is also the expected rate of repayment. For simplicity, we assume that all firms require one dollar of investment to operate.
Each bank has two levels, the center and the local branch. The center controls all of the resources of the bank and decides whether to delegate control rights over lending to the local bank manager. With a fixed cost of m, the local bank manager can perfectly identify θ for each firm in the local economy. 
The first term of equation (2) is the net expected profits from lending and
is the optimal number of firms financed by local bank managers. W is the transfer between the local to the center. We assume the payment W is lump sum. It is easy to show that a profit-sharing contract is non-distorting and equivalent to a lump sum payment. Contracts that do distort incentives (such as revenue-sharing contracts) are dominated by lump sum transfers which can achieve full efficiency and full rent extraction.
To simplify, we also assume the local bank manager has zero reservation utility.
If the center does not decentralize lending authority, she will lend to all firms that apply for loans as long as the expected profit of lending is positive, or 6 0 2
. Therefore, the central manager is willing to decentralize control rights over lending if the benefits from delegation exceeds the expected profits from centralized lending, or
The center will set W to maximize the extraction of surplus from the local bank manager.
From (1), (2) and (3), it follows that the center will decentralize control over lending if and only if
Deriving the comparative statics from (4) is straightforward and yields the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1.
In the basic model with costly information, the center is more likely to decentralize control over lending if the information cost (m) and lending interest rate ( L  R ) are lower and the cost of funds ( I R ) is higher. Assuming a fixed screening cost, more firms (higher N) reduce the per-loan cost of screening and increase the likelihood of decentralization. The effect of the overall quality of firms ( 0 θ ) is ambiguous. 5
Proof. Immediately follows from the derivatives of (4).
Proposition 1 states that the center will decentralize lending authority to take advantage of the local bank manager's costly access to better information. The gain from decentralization can be enlarged if local bank managers can gather information on 5 The assumption that screening exhibits scale economies appears often in the literature, e.g., Berglof and Roland (1998) . Assuming that m is a variable cost does not change most results. If m is a variable cost, we can rewrite
. This leads to two changes: (1) The number of firms (N) has no impact on decentralization; (2) Firm type ( 0 θ ) has a negative effect on decentralization.
borrowers and their projects more effectively. Higher lending interest rates increase the expected return to both decentralized and centralized lending made by local bank managers. However, higher L R encourages local bank managers to finance lower type firms, which reduces the relative benefits of decentralization. Similarly, the cost of funds has the opposite effect of lending interest rates. When we assume scale economies in information gathering, a greater number of potential borrowing firms (N) can lower the perloan cost of information. Finally, higher firm quality (higher 0 θ ) has an ambiguous effect on decentralization. Just as for the lending interest rates, a higher 0 θ raises total profitability under decentralization as shown in (2). However, unlike the L R , the increase is not proportionally. The benefit of decentralization is positively related to the number of unprofitable firms that local bank managers can identify. In the extreme case, when 0 θ reaches a level where all firms applying for loans are financed by the local bank manager, the center may in fact suffer a loss of the amount of m if she decentralizes lending authority.
We can also extend the basic model to examine the roles of other key factors affecting control right allocation. Here, we study the effects of collateral and financial competition.
Collateral The use of collateral increases the payoff to the lender when a project fails. With collateral K, we can rewrite equations (2) and (3) as follows.
. Accordingly, we derive a new version of equation (4),
Inspection of (4a) and (4) reveals that collateral acts like an equal shift in both the lending interest rate and the cost of funds. Effective collateral increases the expected return to lending, lowering the effective cost of funds. However, because P K θ θ ≤ , the use of collateral increases the number of projects financed by both the center and the local, which reduces expected profits per successful loan. Overall, the impact of collateral on optimal decentralization is ambiguous.
Bank Competition
The introduction of bank competition may affect both the number and distribution of firm types of potential borrowers available to the local branch. Our basic model defines P N as the optimal number of firms that will be financed by the local bank manager, where
. If we assume that the competitors are endowed with identical screening technology, the distribution of firm types available to each bank will be the same. However, competition will reduce N, the total number of potential borrowing firms for each bank, and thus centralization of lending authority is more likely.
If screening technologies of competitors differ, competition may also affect the distribution of firm types in the pool of potential borrowers, leading to an ambiguous result. The result on competition also disappears if information costs are assumed to be variable rather than fixed.
A Model with Collusion
One potential agency problem associated with decentralized lending is collusion between local bank managers and their customers. In this subsection, we extend our model to allow managers of borrowing firms to pay bribes to local bank managers in return for loan access. We identify factors that may affect the likelihood and intensity of collusion.
Following Laffont and Martimort (1998) , we assume that the local bank manager can sign a side contract with the manager of the borrowing firm. We consider a firm, i, that has the following profit function,
is the size of loans. For convenience, we assume that profits are simply the
The maximum amount of transfer (or bribe) a firm with type θ is willing to pay for loan access is
This relationship between i T and i θ defines the supply of transfers (see Figure 1) .
Next, we turn to the demand for transfers. The local bank manager will take the transfer from the borrowing firm as long as doing so is personally profitable:
We assume the local bank manager values transfers with a multiple 1 > α (the manager values a unit of transfer more than a unit of profit), a source of the agency problem or inefficiency. The demand curve for transfers is plotted in Figure 1 
FIGURE 1 THE LENDING DECISIONS WITH COLLUSION
From (6) and (7), we can compute the lowest type of firm the local bank manager will finance when collusion is present,
It is obvious that 1
. When collusion prevails, the local bank manager tends to lend to more firms (and lower quality firms) than he otherwise would. Figure 1 shows the types of firms that may be financed under different circumstances. Profitable lending occurs when
. With collusion, the local bank manager is willing to lend to firms with types as low as T θ .
Part of the greater lending is efficient because the ability to charge an extra fee for loans allows the bank to price discriminate and increase profits. Lending to firm types above * θ is efficient. However, to the extent that the transfers are preferred to bank profits, an agency problem is introduced. The agency problem is captured by the difference between * θ and T θ , where
Assuming that the local bank manager can borrow without limit from the market at I R , the presence of collusion increases lending volume by
. As a result, the expected rate of repayment declines from 2
The local bank manager's participation constraint becomes the following,
The first term is the profits from profitable lending. The second term is the summation of losses due to over-lending and positive transfers. The central manager's participation constraint (3) remains the same. (3) and (9) together define the decentralization threshold, 
PROPOSITION 2. The presence of collusion undermines the benefits of decentralization.
The center's decision to delegate lending authority to the local is negatively affected by the valuation of transfers (α) which measures the agency problem of the local bank manager.
The effects of other factors remain the same as in Proposition 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
A Model with Government Influence
Extending our basic model, we assume that local government leaders are able to impose a lump sum fine, G, should their demand for refinancing or new loans for any firms be unsatisfied. To avoid the penalty, local bank managers will finance projects for which
. The threshold firm type receiving loans with government involvement
It is clear that 
Equation (12) together with the central manager's participation constraint in equation (3) gives us the following inequality,
The intuition here is that the benefit of decentralization can be offset if government officials aggressively seek loans to finance projects that may be socially beneficial but economically unprofitable.
PROPOSITION 3. Government interventions discourage decentralization. The more aggressive the local governments are (high G or, equivalently, low G θ ), the more likely centralization will occur. The effects of other factors remain the same as in Proposition 1.
Proof. Immediately following from the derivatives of (13). g
A Model of the Refinancing Decision
To accommodate the refinancing decision, we extend our basic model from one period to multiple periods. Our model shares an essential feature of that of Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) ; it argues that the lack of information can allow the lender to credibly commit not to refinance. However, our definition of decentralization is quite different.
We are interested in whether the center decentralizes control rights to allow local branch managers to approve refinancing loans, or reserves such approval rights for itself. As before, branch managers are assumed to have better information about local projects. By centralizing loan refinancing decisions, the center can credibly commit to having poorer information and to not refinance projects, leading to greater effort by borrowers to make projects successful in some circumstances.
The game between creditor and borrower has three stages. First, the bank decides whether or not to make a new one-dollar loan to a borrower. With some probability θ, the project is successful, yielding return 1 Y , enough to repay the loan principle and interest L R (where
), and a private benefit 1 B to the borrower. 1 B is non-transferable. 6 If the project is unsuccessful, following Berglof and Roland (1998) in the second stage the borrower can exert effort e (from zero to one) to improve the likelihood that the project can yield enough to just cover its costs and repay the loan. With probability e, the project does so, the loan is repaid, and the borrower's payoff is 1 B -w(e), where w(e) is the cost of effort. With probability 1-e, the project fails and the game moves to a third stage in which the bank decides whether to liquidate the project for a certain return V or to make a second one-dollar refinancing loan at interest rate r. Finally, if the loan is refinanced, the
and the borrower earns
, the loan is defaulted on and there is no repayment. The decision nodes of the game are summarized in Figure 2 .
6 B1 can be interpreted in different ways. For example, Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) define it as an opportunity cost for the firm manager to manage his project diligently.
FIGURE 2 REFINANCING DECISIONS
The key to the model is its information assumptions. Following the setup in the basic model, we assume that
where θ is the probability of success and also the type of the firm and We start from the end of the game and work backwards to study the decentralization decision. With perfect information, the bank refinances only projects for
). Otherwise, it liquidates the project, earning V.
With no information, the bank refinances all projects if and only if the expected return is positive (
Otherwise, it refuses to refinance all projects. It is this refusal that for some bad projects acts as a credible commitment not to refinance, and thus induces greater effort to make projects successful earlier.
When the bank makes its refinancing decision, it is guaranteed an expected return of V (at this point in the game we treat the original $1 loan as sunk). The expected profit from refinancing depends on whether the bank is decentralized (d) or centralized (c).
Assuming a uniform distribution for 2 Y , the expected profit when the project has failed (reached the decision to liquidate or refinance) can be expressed as follows for the decentralized (informed) and centralized (uninformed) cases:
If we assume that V r L > (it is more profitable to successfully refinance than to liquidate), then at the game's third stage the bank's expected profit is unambiguously higher when lending is informed.
Knowing these decision rules for liquidation and refinancing, we study the effort decision of the borrower. In particular, we are interested in seeing whether there are any cases (values of 2 Y ) in which informed and uninformed lending lead to different effort levels. In the informed case, the borrower's effort depends on whether he anticipates a successful project and refinancing, since he earns positive returns with refinancing but gets nothing from a sure loser that is liquidated: Y is anticipated to be greater than 1+r, the maximization problem is still:
In this case, effort will be higher when the lender is uninformed. The borrower, instead of reducing effort because he still anticipates a possible payoff when the project is refinanced, will now exert maximum effort because he knows the bank will not refinance and he might be left with nothing. In this way, the bank can improve its loan repayment rate by centralizing refinancing loan approval rights. We denote effort in the decentralized (informed) and centralized (uninformed) cases as ed and ec. From the above, we have shown that
Treating the one dollar loan as a sunk cost, the expected profit at the time of making the original loan is
With probability i e , the original loan will be paid in full, and with probability ( ). In this circumstance, we can write the difference in expected profits in the decentralized versus centralized cases as follows:
Here, ed solves (16) while ec solves (17), so that Proof. The key comparative static results for this expression are the following:
Because the range in which centralization is a viable option depends negatively on 0 θ (by assumption, Y is constant), we expect centralization to be less likely when the expected firm performance (determined by 0 θ ) is high. Also, for clarity of exposition, we have assumed the cost of funds I R to be zero, but it is easy to show that the expected effect of I R is the opposite of L R (negative).
The intuition that the liquidation value has a negative effect on decentralization is that the liquidation value is a type of collateral. As Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) have argued, collateral is a substitute for bank monitoring. The use of effective collateral undermines the importance of local information and thus enables the central manager to centralize control rights over lending.
Finally, we note that this model focuses on the refinancing decision. It makes no predictions on whether the decision to make new loans is centralized or not. In fact, by the assumptions of the model, there would be no reason to centralize new lending.
Summary of the Theoretical Predictions
In this section, we developed several simple models to understand how lending authority is allocated between central and local managers in financial institutions with a two-tier hierarchy. To guide our empirical analysis, we summarize the relationship between different model parameters and the decentralization decision in Table 1 
Data
The data used in this paper were collected from a series of field surveys conducted by the author in the summer of 1998. Unless indicated elsewhere, all the data used in this paper are from the survey. Most of the information was garnered from face-to-face interviews with the bank managers, firm managers and government leaders at the county and township levels. Historical data were copied from accounting books. Most of the questions are for the years 1994 and 1997, respectively, as we believe that fundamental changes in bank behavior began in 1994 when bank competition and commercialization reforms were first explicitly introduced. Our survey focuses on the township (and village) level, the lowest government administrative level in China. Township and village enterprises (TVEs) have been the most dynamic sector of China's economy since economic reform were launched in 1978 (Oi, 1999) . The lowest branches of the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) and rural credit cooperatives (RCCs) all reside at the township level. Our survey estimates that 78 percent of bank loans within the township were granted by these two traditional financial institutions. The bank survey includes interviews of managers from both ABC county branches or RCC county associations and local branches of both ABCs and RCCs.
The survey covers 15 counties in Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces. These two coastal provinces have experienced rapid economic growth in the last two decades, and contain both well-developed and under-developed regions. All of the counties were randomly sampled after stratification by region and industrial output per capita. 7 Four townships were randomly selected in each county after stratifying by industrial output per capita in 1997. The financial institutions we surveyed are the local financial institutions (branches) residing in and around the sample townships. Sixty townships thus were selected in the 15 counties, and government leaders and managers from 59 townships, 57
ABC local branches and 58 RCCs were interviewed. 15 ABC county branches and 15 RCC county associations were also surveyed.
A unique feature of this survey is that we not only collected bank data but also matched data from borrowers and local government leaders where the financial institutions were located. The dynamics of rural development in China in the past two decades were dominated by rapidly emerging TVEs, the main borrowers of rural financial institutions.
The township and village governments, as the effectve owners of TVEs, were actively involved. Local governments were expected to bail out TVEs that were financially distressed or take responsibility for arranging loan repayments using available resources when a firm was shut down or bankrupted.
Financial Decentralization in China
7 According to the economic regions, we grouped all counties in Jiangsu province into three categories: most advanced area, medium advanced area, and less advanced area but in Zhejiang province counties were only divided into two categories: most advanced area and less advanced area. We then divided each area into sub-groups by industrial output per capita in 1997. Finally, from each sub-group, we randomly selected one sample county. 8 counties in Jiangsu and 7 counties in Zhejiang were finally surveyed.
In this section, we describe the financial reforms and the changing behavior of banks in China's rural financial institutions. The financial reforms were designed to grant financial institutions more autonomy. In this section, we first present evidence that shows that since the 1990s considerable progress was made towards this goal. We argue that starting from 1994 the major banks in China had gained the authority to decide on their own how they wanted to organize their internal management functions. Second, we define how we will measure the degree of decentralization. We show that even though China has gone a long way toward financial liberalization, the tendency has been for county banks to retain centralized control over local branches. Third, we show correlation among some of the factors that may explain the centralization of lending authority.
Financial Liberalization and Increasing Autonomy of the Banking Sector
There are two types of decentralization that may occur during financial transition.
One refers to the authorization by the government for financial institutions (at the corporation or conglomerate level) to be granted more latitude in their business operations.
To avoid confusion, we call this first type of measure financial liberalization. The other type of decentralization, which we refer to as decentralization, occurs within the institution, and refers to the allocation of lending authority within the hierarchy of each individual financial institution (for example, the granting of lending authority to the branch bank's manager by headquarters). These two types of organizational change are related in that liberalization affects the environment within which decentralization occurs. However, even though it might seem logical that decentralization would become more common following liberalization, in the case of China's financial reforms, we find that this is not the case.
The bold moves towards financial liberalization taken by reformers in the mid1990s were intended to give each of the major financial institutions more autonomy over their operations. One of the key tasks of the liberalization reforms was to create a financial system free of government interventions. The State Council's "Decision on
Reform of the Financial System", publicized in December, 1993, provided the basis for commercializing China's state-owned specialized banks, including the ABC. This was soon followed by the promulgation of China's first Central Bank Law and Commercial Bank Law (Park and Sehrt, 1999; Lardy, 1998) . 8 In 1994 officials began to separate lending responsibilities of different banks: creating policy banks to handle policy-oriented lending and leaving commercial banks to loan to businesses on the basis of commercial merit. In the rural sector, policy loans originally undertaken by the ABC were taken over by a newly established policy bank -the Agricultural Development Bank of China. Leaders also removed restrictions that had previously kept certain banks from lending to certain sectors or types of borrowers. For example, ABCs were allowed to lend to companies in urban areas even if the firms had no connection with agriculture. Finally, the banks were warned that budgetary transfers would no longer cover their operational losses. Profits, to a much greater degree, would stay inside the banking system. In sum, the liberalization reforms were designed to create a more market-oriented and profit-driven commercial banking system. Specialized banks had been granted much more autonomy and were increasingly allowed to choose their own business plans of action, including the ability to set control rights of their own branch managers so local outlets would be more responsive to meeting the objectives of the parent institution.
Compared to their urban counterparts, in recent years, rural financial institutions have been more commercially motivated. While other state banks like the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China were obligated to finance China's most state-owned enterprises, rural financial institutions were subject to no policy lending requirement in the rapidly emerging rural industrial sector (Che and Qian, 1998) . The main policy lending of rural banks was agricultural procurement loans provided by the ABC to state grain bureaus, but these loans were shifted to the Agricultural Development Bank of China in 1994.
RCCs have never had explicit policy lending responsibilities. Therefore, the lending relationships between rural financial institutions and their clients were more likely driven by commercial purposes rather than government instructions.
Our survey data show that financial liberalization did indeed increase the autonomy of financial institutions and that lending became based more on economic criteria rather than policy. In our survey, we asked the managers of ABC county branches and RCC county associations to weigh the relative importance of different factors that influenced their lending decisions (Table 2 ). In 1990, 41.4 percent (summation of rows 3, 4 and 5) of the managers admitted that local government policies were at least as important as profitability. By 1997, this percentage had dropped dramatically to 3.4 percent.
Meanwhile, the percentage of those managers who claimed that only bank profitability was important jumped from 3.5 percent in 1990 to 55.2 percent in 1997. These figures demonstrate that, by 1997, the central (in this paper, ABC county branches and RCC county associations) managers were focused increasingly on commercial profits as their main objective.
The Record on Decentralization of China's Rural Financial Institutions
Because of the information advantages of local bank managers, the county branch managers might find it efficient to decentralize authority within the organization.
Unfortunately (as discussed above), agency problems and commitment failures can undermine the ability of local bank managers to look out for the bank's greater interests.
To avoid these problems, the bank may instead chose to limit the authority of its branch managers by setting up rules and regulations that constrain their actions and which centralize authority.
Although these rules can take many forms, we primarily examine two types of rules that China's county level banks (the center) implement to restrict the actions of branch managers (the local): loan approval authority and loan size restrictions. One of the most effective ways that upper level officials control the actions of branch managers is by retaining the right to approve loans. In its most restrictive forms, local bank managers work with a client, and submit a loan plan to the upper level manager before any further action can be taken. In other words, loan approval is completely centralized. At the other extreme, local bank managers have complete authority to make loans and only report information about the loan to upper level officials after the fact. There also is a third option between the two extremes in which local loan officers can approve loans of a certain size, but must get approval from upper levels for larger loans. We create an index of loan approval authority as follows: if there is complete control by the upper level officials, the index is 0; if there is a loan size restriction, the index is 1, and if the upper level officials have completely decentralized loan approval authority without restrictions on loan size, the index is 2.
the central bank and facilitated bank commercialization thereafter.
Peculiarities in China's accounting system about the source of funds to be used for making the loans create the need for two sets of measures. One type of loan in Chinese banks is called zengliang daikuan or "loans using incremental funds." Loans of this type use funds that are drawn either a) from the funds set aside for loans which come from the bank's deposits or b) from funds that are transferred into the branch bank from the upper level bank (e.g., funds that are borrowed from the banking system). Loans of this type can be extended to either new or existing clients. In our analysis below, we call loans using incremental funds "Type I loans."
The other type of loan in Chinese banks is called cunliang daikuan or "loans using funds from repaid loans." The funds from which these loans are made become available when an existing loan is paid back. Loans of this type can be made to one of three types of firms: to the firms which the funds had just been collected (relending back to the same clients); to an existing client of the bank with whom the bank has previously had a lenderborrower relationship; or to a new client. In our analysis below, when a "loan using funds from repaid loans" (or cunliang daikuan) is made to either an existing client or to a new client, we call these "Type II loans." We distinguish between cunliang daikuan and Type II loans because the former is loosely defined as, in the case of relending back to the same clients, borrowers merely draw loans under fixed credit lines. Relending back to the same clients does not reflect the true lending authority of local bank managers if the credit lines of borrowers are set by the upper level branch managers or the local bank managers have to relend to the same clients. 9
China's financial system has created these different categories of loans for several reasons. First, allowing firms to draw from a pool of funds generated from the funds that have been repaid from previous loans provides a mechanism to increase the incentive for local branch managers to improve repayment performance (and allow upper level officials to monitor that performance). Higher repayment rates can lead to increased loan volume and raise the potential for earning higher profits. Second, having a source of funds from new incremental sources allows upper level officials to be more selective with funds that are more liquid (and hence are more valuable or have a higher opportunity cost) from their point of view. Data from our survey provides strong evidence that between 1994 and 1997, despite the overall propensity of the rural financial reforms to liberalize banking, officials in rural financial institutions were actively centralizing lending authority. Among the 29 county branch managers we interviewed, about half of them stated that the local bank managers' lending authorities had fallen between 1994 and 1997 (Table 3 ). In contrast, only four of them (or 13.8 percent) believed local branch managers had more loan approval authority in 1997 than in 1994. The information about lending authority in 1997 collected from the interviews with local bank managers shows that county branch managers completely centralized lending control over Type I loans in 68.6 percent of local branches including ABC local branches and RCCs. The rest of local bank managers had at least some lending authority delegated by the county bank managers.
The lending authority over Type II loans were more decentralized than Type I loans were in 1997. The information we have to measure Type II loans is whether a local bank manager could lend to other firms using the funds generated by repaid loans of previous or current borrowing firms. It is a 0 or 1 variable. The levels of centralization of loan approval authority and loan size restrictions for Type I and Type II loans, however, differ sharply. In 1997, higher level officials completely retained (or completely centralized) 68.7 percent of loan approval authority for Type I loans, while completely retaining only 44.0 percent of loan approval authority for Type II loans.
Determinants of Lending Decentralization
In this section, we conduct a set of empirical analyses to further explore the determinants of lending decentralization (or centralization) and their interactions.
Estimation and Variable Definitions
We explain the determinants of lending authority for Type I and Type II loans. As discussed above, the main difference is the source of funds. Type I loans use newly generated funds while Type II loans use loans repaid by previous borrowers. For Type I loans, we define our decentralization measure d1 as follows: d1=0 if no control right is delegated; d1=1 if the maximum amount of single loans the local can approve is defined and any single loan with the amount exceeding the limit needs to be approved by the center; and d1=2 if the local can approve a single loan up to available loanable funds (no single loan limit). For Type II loans, we only have information about whether the local could make loans to other firms using funds from repaid loans (d2=1) or not (d2=0). The unobserved latent propensity to decentralize lending authority, d*, is defined as follows: county bank level data are collected from interviews with county branch managers. We use data from the year of 1996 for some variables to reduce endogeneity problems.
Information Technology and the Characteristics of Local Bank Managers
If local managers were assigned randomly, their individual characteristics, such as educational background and local experience, would be good measures of their ability to gather information (or the cost of information). However, in practice, local mangers are not appointed randomly. Rather, the county manager is likely to choose local managers simultaneously with her decision to decentralize lending authority. Both decisions will consider the ability of the local bank manager to gather information and his ability to resist local agency problems. For the purpose of gathering information effectively, it is better to have a manager who has served in the local branch longer. But to avoid agency problems like collusion, local managers may need to be rotated periodically, which is what we observe in practice.
We consider three local bank manager characteristics: the manager's formal education (EDU)--a dummy variable equal to one if the manager's educational level is higher than high school, the number of years the manager has lived in the local township (YRLIVE), and the number of years the manager has held his current position (TENURE).
All three variables are likely to be positively related to a manager's information gathering and processing skills. However, YRLIVE and TENURE may also affect the susceptibility of the manager to local political pressure, since over time the manager may develop personal and professional relationships with local government officials and managers.
Longer tenure, in particular, may lead to greater commitment and agency problems as local firm managers and leaders seek refinancing loans for projects approved previously by the manager or increase their political influence.
Our main concern is the endogeneity of manager characteristics to unobserved characteristics of local townships that also affect decentralization. County managers have great discretion in assigning managers to different townships in their county, but there is no movement of branch managers across counties. One way to deal with the endogeneity problem is to take county averages of branch manager characteristics for each financial institution. Studying how results change using township and county means for the manager characteristics can help us understand the nature of the selection bias. Thus, we run separate regressions of (22) using local branch level data and county mean data. Using the county means does not eliminate the endogeneity problem, because township managers are likely to have lower values of YRLIVE and TENURE in counties where rotation is occurring more frequently.
However, the direction of selection bias should be the same for county means and township data, so a reversal of signs would suggest that the effect of county mean characteristics is significant despite the selection bias.
Three other variables are also related to the effectiveness of local information held by local bank managers. First, the past loan performance (LNPERF) may capture the capability of local branch managers in managing loans. It is defined by the proportion of a local branch's borrowing firms that repaid loans on time in 1996. We take the lagged variable to avoid the endogeneity problem. Second, during the survey, we asked local bank managers to estimate the total number of current and potential borrowing firms (the pool of borrowing firms, FMNUM) and their qualities within their business territories. 10 Third, managers from both ABC local branches and RCCs were also asked to estimate the market share of lending for both themselves and their competitors. To avoid estimation bias, we measure the market share for each ABC local branch and RCC by taking the average of the market shares estimated by their own (for example, the ABC local bank manager) and their competitor (for example, the RCC manager). Finally, we use one subtracts the local branch's own lending share to represent banking competition (COMP). The higher the share, the more severe the banking competition.
Independent Variables
We use the annual income per capita of workers in each local branch to measure the valuation of transfers (VT). Assuming a decreasing marginal utility to income, lower income should increase the desirability of transfers or bribes. Although we have controlled separately for the quality of past lending, if bonuses are tied to performance, income might also be related to the branch's recent performance, which may reflect the manager's ability or the severity of local agency problems.
Government interventions in lending are a discrete variable. Based on the information provided in Table 2 , we generate an ordered variable (GOV). We redefine 3 (row 4 and 5 in Table 2 ) as government policy is more important than bank profitability, 2 (row 2 and 3) as government policy is somewhat important, and 1 as bank profitability is more important (row 1).
Collateral and liquidation value are correlated and we use one variable to capture the effect of both, i.e., the liquidation cost. We define the liquidation cost by ranks between 1 and 5, where 1 means that high liquidation cost was a serious problem and 5 means liquidation cost was not an issue at all. The answers show that 65.8 percent of local bank manager ranked it with 1 or 2 (very serious and serious, respectively). Only 25.3 percent of them ranked it 5 (not a problem). Here higher ranking represents lower liquidation costs or higher liquidation value (LIQ). We took county averages for ABC and RCCs respectively for townships with branches missing values.
The lending interest rate (LNRATE) is defined by the annual percentage yield of a six-month loan at the end of 1997. Our survey indicates that lending interest rates had a margin of 10 to 50 percent of the base rate set by the PBC. The actual lending rates of ABC county branches were 10 or 20 percent above the base rate while those of RCC county associations were 40 or 50 percent above the base rate. The lending interest rates within a county and the same financial institution were unified. This indicates that the lending interest rate might also be endogenous. However, the actual lending interest rates for ABC county branches and RCC county associations were relatively concentrated. The ABC fell to the low end of 10 and 20 percent and RCCs ended in the high end (40 or 50 percent). The choices each county branch managers had were limited. Second, the actual lending interest rates were less of a problem of endogeneity as long as there was enough bank competition that forced each financial institution to adopt the competitive interest rates. In other words, the variation was mainly caused by region-specific changes rather than institution-specific ones. The simple correlation test of the lending interest rates between the ABC and RCCs supports this argument (the correlation coefficient is 0.38).
The cost of funds is reflected by both the actual cost and the opportunity cost of funds. We consider three variables that may jointly determine the cost of funds. The actual fund cost (COST) is measured by a local branch's deposit structure, the share of long-tern deposits over total deposits. The deposit rates are set by the PBC and are all fixed. Usually, the interest rates for long-term deposits (e.g., certificate of deposits) are higher than short-term deposits. The cost is higher if the long-tern deposits are proportionally higher. However, the actual fund cost does not capture the opportunity cost of funds. Theoretically, local branches could always borrow from their county branches with an internal lending rate usually lower than the market rate. Meanwhile, the borrowing ability was subject to the so-called loan-deposit ratio management. It was less likely to borrow from the county branch should the loan-deposit ratio in a local branch was already high. We use the loan-deposit ratios in both the county branches (CLDRO) and local branches (LLDRO) in the beginning of 1997 to reflect the difficulty of further borrowing.
The former is defined by plan of county branch managers for the year of 1997 and the latter is the actual loan-deposit ratio by the end of 1996.
A firm is defined as a good type if the local bank manager is willing to finance it should the firm apply for loans in this branch. Given total number of borrowing firms in a community (FIRMNUM), the share of qualified borrowers (FMTYPE) reflects the average good types of potential borrowing firms within a local community. It is possible, however, that the share of qualified borrowers could be biased. A local bank manager facing poor loan performance might complain about the firm quality and thus underestimate the overall firm quality. We ran a simple linear regression of (22) using the share of profitable township enterprises as an instrument. 11 The fact that sign of FMTYPE remained the same after instrumentation suggests that the measurement error is negligible.
We include bank dummies (0=RCCs and 1=ABC local branches) to capture the institutional differences between these two financial institutions. For example, the ABC has a multiple-tier hierarchy within its conglomerate while RCCs only have two tiers, the county and the local. From the point of view of capital flows, the ABC integrates to the nationwide credit market and RCCs focus more on the local market. As a result, RCCs have a more close relationship than the ABC does. A provincial dummy (PROV) is also included in both estimations because traditionally collectively run TVEs are well developed in Jiangsu province while Zhejiang province has a strong private sector. The provincial dummy captures the unobservables between these two provinces. Considering our sampling strategy, we use county identification as the cluster in all estimations to absorb county fixed effect.
Empirical Results
Although there was a move towards centralization, the data show that different localities and different banking system made different choices. In 1997, about half of local bank managers had the same or more authority over lending as in 1994. As expected, local bank managers had more control over Type II loans than Type I loans. Table 5 also shows that RCC county associations delegated more control rights to RCC managers than ABC county branches did to their local branch managers. Yet in 6 counties out of 15, ABC local bank managers had different control rights and 10 out of 15 RCC county associations delegated control rights to local RCCs. Therefore, clearly there were differences in the extent of the allocation of control rights among banks, counties, and even among townships within counties.
The concern over agency problems and commitment failures may have explained much of the observed rich variations. Empirical evidence confirms many of the predictions arising from the theoretical models. First, the predicted relationships are apparent from simple across tabulations for both Type I loans and Type II loans consistently (Table 6) Other variables like lending interest rate and firm quality meet the predictions as well. The only variables that fail to show the predicted relationships with decentralization are the characteristics of local bank managers. Education background, for example, has a negative relationship with decentralization so that more education led to less control. We believe that those patterns are likely due to endogeneity problems which we discuss in greater detail below.
Next, we present the empirical results from two sets of estimations, one for Type I loans and the other for Type II loans. To deal with endogeneity concerns, we run three separate regressions for each type of loans. The first specification omits potentially endogenous variables related to the characteristics of local bank managers. The second specification includes all such variables, using the data from local branches. The third specification takes county averages for omitted variables in specification 1 to help to reduce the endogeneity problems. We also present a probit estimation for Type I loans, reestimating specification 3 after redefining 1 as limited or full controls. Using township or county data for manager characteristics had no impact on the estimates of other coefficients. We also ran linear regressions for all four specifications. Almost all variables have the same signs as those presented in Table 7 .
While all the empirical results are consistent with our theoretical predictions, we find that different factors affect Type I and Type II loans differently. Generally speaking, the allocation of control rights of both types of loans reflects the information advantage of local bank managers. However, Type I loans were more subject to agency and commitment problems. Coefficient estimations for Type I loans are very consistent with the refinancing model, in particular, leading credence to our conjecture that many Type I loans were refinancing loans during the period of study. Type II loans appear to be more like working capital loans. Table 7 reports the results of coefficient estimates for the determinants of control rights over Type I loans. Most signs confirm our theoretical predictions and are statistically significant across specifications.
Type I Loans
The selection of local bank managers does have an impact on the decentralization decision. Among the three variables associated with the characteristics of local bank managers, only education background has consistent signs. The fact that the signs for two variables related to local bank manager characteristics, YRLIVE and TENURE, flipped after taking county averages (YRLIVE is negative and TENURE is positive in specification 2 and the signs are the opposite in specification 3) suggests that the selection of local bank managers was likely endogenous to concerns affecting decentralization. One story consistent with these results is that local bank managers with longer local residence (and better information) and shorter tenure (fewer agency and commitment problems) were placed in locations with greater agency or commitment problems. After replacing the local bank data with bank-wise county averages, the signs reverse, suggesting that YRLIVE and TENURE have positive (and statistically significant) and negative (not significant) effects on decentralization and that these affects show up significantly despite selection bias toward zero. Also, because our government influence variable is a county-level variable, using county means for manager characteristics better controls for agency problems (there are no controls for within-county township variation). Managers' education is expected to be less subject to endogeneity bias because education does not change with rotation. The coefficient on EDU is statistically significant only in the probit estimation in specification 4, but its sign is positive across all specifications as expected, and the signs are consistent whether using township data or county means (consistent with less selection). Overall, the results are consistent in which lower costs of information, as measured by education and years lived locally, increase the likelihood of decentralization. The negative (but statistically insignificant) sign on TENURE suggests that tenure increases commitment and agency problems.
Other factors associated with the information cost advantage of local branch managers had positive effects on decentralization, i.e., the number of total borrowing firms in the community, bank competition, and past bank performance. The number of total borrowing firms has a strong and consistent positive sign across specifications. The bigger the size of the local economy, the more likely that the county branch managers will benefit from decentralizing authority to local bank managers. Bank competition, which shrinks the pool of borrowers of each bank and thus increases the per-loan information cost, has a similarly important impact on decentralization, but in the opposite direction. Our empirical results show that, although not statistically significant, a branch's past performance positively affects the decision of decentralization across specifications. Good past performance may imply either that local firms had good projects or that the branch manager performed his duties well, but the former is controlled by firm quality. Capable managers got more control.
The empirical results suggest that commitment problems are more important than agency problems in Chin's rural financial sector. All predictions made in the refinancing model are satisfied perfectly. In fact, all variables with conflicting predictions in theoretical models turn out have the signs consistent with the refinancing model. The lending interest rate has positive signs across specifications and is statistically significant in the probit estimation. The cost of funds displays the same effects but the opposite direction. The share of long-term deposits and the loan-deposit ration of the county branch in the beginning of 1996 reduce the likelihood of decentralization. The local branch's loan-deposit ratio has a negative sign but a weaker effect. Firm quality has positive signs across specifications.
One explanation of the dominance of the refinancing model is that, after the rapid expansion of the rural industrial sector in the early 1990s, competition within and outside the sector prevented new firms from entry. Most new loans were in fact directed to refinance existing firms. Furthermore, declining performance among township and village enterprises in the mid-1990s led to a large increase of firms requesting refinancing making it a key concern of local banks.
Still, the results also show that collusion and government interventions also contributed to the observed centralization. The valuation of transfers as measured by average income per capita within the local branches has positive signs in all three specifications and two out of three are statistically significant. However, income may also reflect bank performance and so pick up effects on firm quality and bank's management ability. The impact of government interventions in lending has a strong and negative effect. The branch managers are less likely to decentralize lending controls if they felt that there are aggressive government interventions.
Type II Loans
The empirical results of Type II loans are presented in Table 8 . The main theoretical predictions over decentralization of Type II loans are satisfied although the results are not as robust as they were for the estimation of Type I loans. However, the results are consistent with our beliefs about the difference between type I and Type II loans. Type I loans uses funds available to finance new project or refinancing existing projects and Type II loans use funds from repaid loans. Therefore, the delegation decision may also be looked at as an incentive device that encourages local bank managers to collect loans that are already due or overdue.
The difficulty to get loans (especially overdue loans) repaid undermined local bank managers' ability to lend Type II loans. The survey shows that, because of insufficient guarantees and high liquidation costs, of the non-performing loans that existed by the end of 1996, only about 15 percent of them were recovered during the year of 1997. For those loans newly made to TVEs during 1997, on average 56.5 percent of them were just rolled over. During the same period, 47.3 percent of new loans granted to private enterprises belonged to the same category. 13 When most loans were lent back to the same borrowing firm as working capital loans, there was not much room for refinancing. We may expect that, for Type II loans, refinancing was less of a concern of county branch managers in allocating control rights.
First, the selection of local bank managers has the same impact as it did in the case of Type I loans. The local bank manager's ability in gathering information was still an important factor for the county branch manager in deciding which manager to hire.
Different from Type I loans, past loan performance in Type II loans plays a positive and significant role.
Second, surprisingly, liquidation value or, in other words, effective collateral, has a positive sign, the opposite sign of that obtained in the estimations of Type I loans. The overall prediction in this paper for the effect of liquidation value is ambiguous. It has a prediction of negative sign in the refinancing model but ambiguous prediction in the models involving collusion and government interventions. The fact that it has a positive sign may be explained by two different reasons. First, refinancing concern for Type II loans was not as important for Type I loans. Second, to encourage local bank managers to collect overdue loans, county branch managers delegated more control rights over Type II loans to the local bank managers whenever they are more capable of doing so with the assistance of the liquidation option.
Third, as in Type I loans, the lending interest rate has consistent positive signs across specifications but not statistically significant. Also the share of long-term deposits, one of the three variables measuring cost of finds, has negative signs as predicted.
However, in contrast, Type I loans where the loan-deposit ratio in the county branch had a significant anf negative sign for Type II loans, the loan-deposit ratio in the local branches dominated. Since the source of Type II loans is the funds from repaying loans, this implies that only local branch's own credit constraint not the county level one mattered for Type II loans. Type I loans, on the other hand, were subject to the constraint of overall loanable funds within the county as the local bank managers could always borrow additional funds from the county branch managers.
Fourth, some variables have the predicted signs but are less robust. Firm quality shows the same sign as it did in the estimation of Type I loans but is not statistically significant. We also see a weak impact of government interventions on control right decentralization. Lastly, as expected, the size of the pool of borrowing firms in the local community as well as bank competition had no impact on decentralization due to the inflexibility of existing loans.
Finally, the valuation of transfer, defined by the annual income per capita, has the predicted positive signs.
Conclusions
China's financial reform has been aiming at facilitating independent financial intermediation. The introduction of bank competition, reduction of policy loans, and selfrestrained government involvement in lending have strengthened the independence of financial institutions. Although most financial institutions are still run by the government, they are increasingly motivated to lend based on commercial principals rather than government policies, especially for rural financial institutions facing mostly non stateowned enterprises. However, contradicted to the trend of financial liberalization and theory of decentralization, well motivated financial institutions tended to centralize lending authority within the hierarchy of their own institutions.
Using the unique data set collected by the author, we show that the potential agency problems (collusion, government influence) and commitment failures (excessive refinancing) in a transitional environment undermined the benefits of decentralization and made centralization more preferable. The empirical results strongly support our theoretical predictions. Centralization in fact served as a commitment device to resolve the agency and commitment problems. In other words, centralization is more likely to occur in an environment where these problems prevail.
The recent centralization of lending authority directly affects credit allocation.
Centralization may solve the agency and commitment problems but at a cost of better information of local bank managers. Not surprisingly, a well-motivated and centralized bank will ration out small and often risky borrowers instantly. Fewer firms would be financed as a result of credit rationing. For example, the average loan-deposit ratio of our sample branches has declined from 79.3 percent in 1994 to 70.0 percent in 1997. Among them ABC local branches dropped the ratio from 83.5 percent to 70.3 percent during the same time.
The research in this paper has implications to future financial reforms in China in particular and in other transition economies in general. Financial reform alone can hardly achieve the goal of optimal credit allocation. It depends on reforms in related sectors, the maturity of market institutions, and, more importantly, the effectiveness of regulatory and supervision from the central bank. Our work in this paper focuses on the relationship between the county branches and local branches by assuming that the county branches are maximizing profits. Agency and commitment problems may also occur in the upper level branches as long as there are explicitly or implicitly deposits or, in other words, the bank managers do not have to bear the cost of their own actions.
Proof of Proposition 2
We have the following comparative static: Note: All the results were derived based on the assumption of fixed information cost. While most of the signs remain the same, assuming variable information cost drops the variables of Number of Total Firms (N) and Banking Competition (c ) and changes the sign of Average Firm Quality (θ0) from uncertain to negative.
TABLE 2 GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN LENDING
1990 1997
1. Bank profitability was solely important 3.5 55.2 2. Both were important, but bank profitability was more important 51.7 35.5 3. Both were equally important 13.8 3.4 4. Both were important, but government policy was more important 20.7 0 5. Government policy was solely important 6.9 0 6. Others 3.4 6.9
Note: This table is estimated by managers from ABC county branches and RCC county associations. Local government leaders were asked the same questions and similar results were obtained. 
